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Abstract 
 
 
This project examines the rhetorical devices and practices used by the Obama 
Administration to express and construct opposition to the Palestinian Authority’s 
statehood bid.  This study focuses on uncovering the ideology embedded within 
President Obama’s Speech to the United Nations General Assembly during the 
opening of the 66th Session.  By conducting an ideology rhetorical analysis of this 
text, this examination will uncover the reasoning that Obama deploys to make 
sense of and define the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, and more specifically, the 
Palestinian bid for statehood.  This ideology has contributed to the perpetuation of 
the Israeli occupation of the Palestinian territories; thereby, denying the 
Palestinians the right to self-determination.                
 
This thesis is organized as follows: Section I introduces Obamas’s speech to the 
UNGA through a brief overview of the text and outlines my analyses’ goals.  
Section II contextualizes the history of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and 
summarizes Obama’s speech to the UNGA.  Section III presents a description of 
the ideological approach to rhetorical criticism, contributions to the field of 
ideological criticism, examples of the method’s application, and a rationale for its 
selection.  Section IV reports the findings of my analysis of Obama’s speech to 
the UNGA and evaluates the contribution that my analysis makes to the 
understanding of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.  Section V provides a brief 
update on Palestine’s UN bid following Obama’s speech.  
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I. Introduction 
 
On September 21, 2011, US President Barack Obama addressed the United 
Nations General Assembly (UNGA) during the opening of the 66th session by 
covering a wide range of international issues.  He focused on the so-called “Arab 
Spring,” the controversial issue of the Palestinian statehood bid, nuclear weapons 
and disarmament, and lastly, wider socioeconomic issues such as education and 
human rights.  I conducted an ideological critique on the 846 words that he used 
to frame and construct an opposition to the Palestinian Authority’s plans to submit 
a formal resolution seeking statehood and full membership status to the United 
Nations Security Council.  The structure of my thesis is organized following 
Sonja Foss’ five major components of a critical essay: 
(1) an introduction, in which you discuss the research question, its 
contribution to rhetorical theory, and its significance; (2) a description of 
the artifact and its context; (3) a description of the method of criticism [in 
this case, ideological analysis]; (4) a report of the findings of the analysis, 
in which you identity the ideology manifest in the artifact and the 
rhetorical strategies that promote it over other ideologies; and (5) a 
discussion of the contribution the analysis makes to rhetorical theory (Foss 
220). 
 
 The Obama administration’s foreign policy on the Israeli-Palestinian 
conflict has been heavily criticized on both sides of the political spectrum.  The 
left, and some international European and Middle Eastern allies, have called him 
out on his double standard approach of supporting self-determination and 
resistance movements in Tunisia, Egypt, and Libya, but not in the Occupied 
Palestinian Territories.  The right, on the other hand, has accused him of not being 
supportive enough of Israel (Shapiro 2).  The current official United States 
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position is that Palestinian statehood should not be determined by the United 
Nations; rather, it is a subject for direct bilateral negotiations between the Israelis 
and Palestinians.  Moreover, the United States threatened to use its veto power, as 
a permanent member of the United Nations Security Council (UNSC), to block 
any resolution seeking statehood (Rogin 1). 
 Standing in front of the international community at the UN General 
Assembly, Obama had an opportunity to explain his administration’s opposition 
to the Palestinian bid to join the world body.  He reminded the international 
delegates that he stood at the same podium in September 2010 calling for an 
independent Palestinian state within the year.  But, here he was a year later, doing 
his best to avoid a UN showdown by thwarting the same outcome that he himself 
promised the previous year.  Near the beginning of his speech’s section that 
focused on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, Obama described his effort to break the 
“stalemate” in negotiations (3).  Getting to the issue at hand, Obama then spoke 
about the failures of the negotiations and alluded to the Palestinian statehood 
issue: 
Now, I know many are frustrated by the lack of progress.  I assure you, so 
am I ... there is no short cut to the end of a conflict that has endured or 
decades.  Peace is hard work.  Peace will not come through statements and 
resolutions at the United Nations -- if it were that easy, it would have been 
accomplished by now ... Ultimately, it is the Israelis and the Palestinians -- 
not us -- who must reach agreement on the issues that divide them: on 
borders and on security, on refugees and Jerusalem (3). 
 
Obama then asserted that “America’s commitment to Israel’s security is 
unshakable.  Our friendship with Israel is deep and enduring ... [and Palestine’s 
friends] do them no favors” by refusing to recognize Israel and its position (4).   
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 In describing the Jewish people as having been victimized throughout 
history and having “forged a successful state of their own,” while larger hostile 
neighboring nations “threaten to wipe it off the map,” Obama was predominately 
speaking to an American and Israeli domestic political audience (Adams 3).  He 
mentioned neither illegal Israeli settlement construction on land that will 
potentially become a part of the future Palestinian state nor the Israeli military 
occupation of Palestinian territory.  While lecturing sympathizers of the 
Palestinian struggle that their hostile attitude towards Israel does not help their 
cause, he ignored the plight of Palestine and the Palestinians.  Furthermore, other 
than in vague terms, Obama did not make a direct case against the Palestinian 
statehood bid or substantively explain the US position.  Rather than using the UN 
General Assembly as a forum to discuss the issues surrounding Palestinian self-
determination and its impact on the interests of the Israeli and American people 
substantively, he appeared to be more focused on improving his domestic 
approval rating and re-election prospects by resorting to empty rhetoric and vague 
narratives in his construction of an opposition to the Palestinian statehood vote 
(Adams 4).                 
 To succeed in American presidential politics, candidates must express the 
importance of Israel as a strategic American ally and reaffirm their commitment 
to Israel’s perceived security interests.  A candidate's stalwart support for the 
State of Israel is important not only to Jewish-American voters who have 
emotional and/or familial ties to the state, but also to evangelical Christians who 
largely support the state out of theological obligation.  Basically, to win votes and 
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to secure a large source of campaign donations, he should use any opportunity 
that presents itself to wrap himself in an Israeli flag - metaphorically speaking - 
whether during a televised debate or on the campaign trail.  For powerful lobby 
groups in Washington, the strong backing of Israel is nothing short of a litmus test 
(Kitfield 1).  For Obama, a first-term president with a low approval rating and 
little more than a year left before the 2012 presidential campaign, this speech at 
the UNGA, just like every other high-profile one, was a campaign speech 
(Hechtkopf 1).     
 As a student of rhetorical criticism, I seek to understand how Obama 
organizes and employs language and its effects in his UNGA address.  James 
Herrick, professor of communication at Hope College, offers his insight on the 
relationship between rhetoric and persuasion in his piece, “An Overview of 
Rhetoric:” 
There is more to rhetoric than persuasion alone, rhetoric has been 
traditionally concerned with the techniques for gaining compliance. ... 
This close association [between rhetoric and persuasion] has always been 
at the heart of the conflict over whether rhetoric is a neutral tool for 
bringing about agreements, or an immoral activity that ends in 
manipulation and deception (3). 
Obama’s political speech seeks to persuade his audience that the United Nations 
is the wrong forum for the Palestinians to seek statehood recognition, and to enlist 
his audience’s compliance to oppose the Palestinian statehood bid.   
 Herrick later defines rhetoric as the “systematic study and intentional 
practice of effective symbolic expression” (7).  Furthermore, he explains that 
rhetorical theory is “the systematic presentation of the art of rhetoric, descriptions 
of rhetoric's various functions, and explanations of how rhetoric achieves its 
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goals” (7).  Although many scholars use the terms rhetoric and communication 
synonymously, Herrick argues that doing so “ignores genuine and historically 
important distinctions among types of communication ranging from information 
and reports through casual conversations to outright propaganda” (7-8).  There are 
six distinguishing characteristics of rhetorical discourse that set it apart from other 
types of communication, with rhetorical discourse being the “marks” that the art 
of rhetoric leaves on messages.  The rhetoric that Obama, as the rhetor, employed 
in his UNGA speech contained these six characteristics of rhetorical discourse: 
planned, adapted to an audience, shaped by human motives, responsive to a 
situation, persuasion seeking, and concerned with contingent issues (8).       
 Planned: Given that Obama’s address to the UNGA was indeed a speech, 
the rhetorical discourse employed involved some level of forethought or planning.  
Whether Obama wrote the speech himself or collaborated with members of his 
staff, decisions were made as to how Obama should address his audiences.  
Furthermore, regardless of the speech’s goal, Obama’s desire to achieve this goal 
governed the planning and adaption process that marked his rhetoric concerning 
the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.  Everything from word choice and phrasing to 
inclusion and omission of content was consciously thought-out.  The writer(s) of 
the speech chose to employ specific language that would more effectively achieve 
its purpose, whether it be persuasion, mutual understanding, clarity, or beauty.  
Some of the issues that might have arisen during this process include uncertainty 
about which arguments to address, which evidence to use, and how to arrange the 
arguments and evidence.  
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 Adapted to an audience:  Obama had to attempt to identify his primary 
audience (domestic critics or supporters, special interest groups, international 
allies) and he had to keep this imagined audience in mind while forming a link 
between his own views and theirs.  This link would allow him to attend to his 
targeted audience’s experiences, beliefs, values, aspirations, and social status 
(Herrick 9).  However, Obama must also have attempted not to alienate or offend 
his secondary and tertiary audiences by emphasizing various subtle 
“enthymemes,” which were the arguments built from the values, beliefs, or 
knowledge held in common between himself and his audience (Herrick 10).  For 
example, while possibly dedicating a majority of his UNGA speech to appeasing 
the wealthy and influential pro-Israel crowd by reaffirming the United States 
“unshakeable” commitment to Israel, Obama also may have tried to mitigate the 
negative reaction of the pro-Palestinian crowd by justifying his arguments as 
based on their shared value of furthering peace (Obama 3-4).  
 Shaped by human motives: By engaging in rhetoric, Obama, as a head of 
state, acted symbolically in response to various motives, which consisted of the 
commitments, goals, desires, or purposes that collectively led him to deliver his 
speech.  Not only would Obama have addressed his audience with his goals in 
mind, but also the planning and adaption process that marked his rhetoric would 
have been governed by his desire to achieve his goals.  Although no one, other 
than Obama himself, knows his internal motives with certainty, rhetorical critics 
can generally speculate that they may have included making converts to a point of 
view, building a consensus that enables group action, forging an agreement that 
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makes peaceful existence possible, a combination of the three, or something else 
entirely.  Moreover, critics can assume that Obama had to align his motives with 
his audience’s commitments.  Therefore, Obama and/or his speech writers would 
have attempted to understand his audience’s values, identify factors prompting 
them to action, and grasp the symbolic resources for drawing them together 
(Herrick 10-11).   
 Responsive to a situation: As previously mentioned, throughout the first 
half of 2011, Obama was suffering from low domestic approval ratings and was 
receiving extensive criticism of his Middle East foreign policy record by a 
formidable right-wing opposition that seeks to unseat him in the upcoming 2012 
presidential election (Shaprio 2).  After Obama declared that a future Palestinian 
state should be based on “the 1967 borders with mutually agreed land swaps” in 
an address to the State Department, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu 
criticized Obama in a statement saying that this could leave Israel with borders 
that were “indefensible”  (Netanyahu 1).  Fearing that his Middle East Policy was 
perceived as being too hostile to Israel, Obama began to intensify his pro-Israeli 
rhetoric, which further encouraged the Palestinian Authority to carry out its plans 
to seek statehood recognition at the United Nations.  Obama now had to use his 
opportunity to address the UNGA to please powerful domestic lobbying groups 
and Jewish-American and Evangelical voting demographics that have an interest 
in ensuring that Palestinians do not receive UN membership status (Kitfield 1).  
Thus, Obama faced the challenge of rallying international opposition to the 
 8 
looming Palestinian statehood bid, while simultaneously trying to mend US 
relations with the Arab world. 
 Persuasion Seeking: Since it was the United States position that 
Palestinian statehood is a subject for peace negotiations rather than something to 
be determined by membership in the United Nations, Obama had to express his 
opposition to the Palestinian statehood bid effectively (Memmott 1).  To do this, 
he had to construct a persuasive narrative as to why a move by the Palestinian 
Authority to seek Palestine’s full membership as a state at the United Nations 
threatens the Middle East Peace Process.  Assisting this possible goal of 
persuading the international community that a “yes” vote for Palestinian statehood 
would be detrimental to regional peace and stability, Obama used the following 
four symbolic resources: arguments, appeals, arrangement, and aesthetics.  The 
application of these resources, as detailed in section IV, provides evidence that 
Obama’s rhetoric was carefully planned discourse, adapted to a particular 
audience, revealing human motives, and responsive to a set of circumstances 
(Herrick 15). 
 Concerned with continent issues: The section of Obama’s speech 
concerning the Middle East Peace Process addresses real and unresolved issues.  
Also, it engages our decision-making capacities on our underlying value 
commitments to the Israelis and Palestinians.  Since Obama’s statements on the 
Israeli-Palestinian conflict embody neither inevitable facts nor virtual 
impossibilities, it is possible for the United States to adopt an alternative position 
on the peace process.  This demonstrates that the Israeli-Palestinian conflict 
9  
consists of issues that are subject to change overtime.  As Obama attempts to 
resolve these contingent issues, rhetoric has come into play (Herrick 16). 
 In summary, all six of Herrick’s characteristics of rhetorical discourse  
operate in the rhetoric Obama used to discuss the Israeli-Palestinian conflict in his 
UNGA speech.  After balancing a variety of interests and goals, Obama 
consciously crafted a narrative that he thought would appeal to his targeted 
audience.  Although I can only speculate as to whether or not Obama adapted his 
speech to a specific audience in order to advance a hidden and questionable 
agenda, his speech did appeal to some audiences more than to others.  More 
specifically, while the speech’s content portrayed itself as a serious attempt to 
explain why the United States opposes a move by Palestine to seek statehood 
recognition, a close examination reveals that it consists of strategically placed 
abstract words and phrases that collectively form a biased narrative.  It is as if 
Obama not only rehearsed Israeli arguments against the Palestinian Authority’s 
bid, but also adopted Israel’s narrative on the conflict as well.         
 I argue that the speech, rather than substantively explaining the US stance 
on Palestinian statehood, sought to persuade other member states to follow the US 
lead in opposing the Palestinian Authority’s statehood bid when it came time for 
them to vote in either the UNGA or UNSC.  Yet the first half of Obama’s speech 
failed to account for the many inconsistencies in US efforts to advance human 
dignity and freedom around the world during the “Arab Spring,” and became even 
less persuasive once he reached the Palestinian question.  After praising 
democratic self-determination in the Arab world, Obama insisted that the only 
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true route to Middle East peace along with Palestinian statehood must come from 
direct bilateral negotiations with the Israelis, as “there are no shortcuts” (Obama 
1-4).  This incongruous message offered Palestinians no incentive to change 
course, and if anything, reinforced the Palestinian UN argument. 
   My role as an ideological critic of Obama’s UNGA speech is to 
understand the reasoning Obama deploys to make sense of and define the Israeli-
Palestinian conflict, and more specifically, the Palestinian bid for statehood.  
Since Obama’s words reflect the position of the United States, a permanent 
member of the UNSC with veto power, the underlying ideology that the speech 
articulates becomes hegemonic.  In this case, the ideology manifested in Obama’s 
speech concerning Palestinian statehood consists of the following pattern of 
beliefs, each stated explicitly within the speech: “Palestinian people deserve a 
state of their own;” “Genuine peace can only be realized between the Israelis and 
Palestinians themselves;” “Peace will not come through statements and 
negotiations at the United Nations;” “Peace depends on compromise among the 
Israelis and Palestinians;” “The path to a Palestinian state will be through 
negotiations between the parties” (Obama 3).  These components of the ideology 
will shape future discourse about whether or not the United Nations is an 
appropriate forum for the realization of a Palestinian state.   
 The research question that guides my analysis is the following: what 
rhetorical devices and practices does Obama use to construct an opposition to the 
Palestinian Authority’s statehood bid?  After applying an ideological criticism to 
the text of Obama’s speech and laying out the results of my analysis, I discuss the 
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contribution my analysis makes to rhetorical theory.  To articulate this 
contribution, I move away from my critique of Obama’s UNGA speech and 
answer my research question more generally and abstractly.  For example, I am 
interested in how Obama’s construction of an opposition to the Palestinian 
statehood bid simultaneously works to perpetuate the Israeli occupation over the 
Palestinian territories. 
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II. Context of the Artifact and Its Description 
 
This section details the relevant historical context leading up to United States 
President Barack Obama’s speech at the United Nations General Assembly.  After 
providing the background of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and the reasoning 
behind the Palestinian resolution for statehood, I highlight how the Obama 
administration and international community has addressed the conflict in recent 
years.  The inclusion of these historical narratives informs my investigation of the 
rhetorical construction of Obama’s speech.  At the end of this section, I provide 
an update on the Palestinian’s bid for statehood following Obama’s speech to 
illustrate the impact of Obama’s efforts to construct an opposition to the statehood 
bid.   
 
Brief Background of the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict 
 
Since 1920, when Great Britain received the mandate of Palestine from the 
League of Nations, there has been armed conflict between the Jewish and Arab 
populations living in Palestine.  For instance, there was a nationalist uprising by 
Palestinian Arabs from 1936-1939, known as the Arab Revolt, against British 
colonial rule, land transfers, and mass Jewish immigration (Benny 129).  Despite 
pressure to allow increased immigration of Holocaust survivors following World 
War II, the British limited Jewish immigration to quell the revolts and advocate a 
binational state (British White Paper).  As a response, between 1944-1948, the 
Jewish Resistance Movement waged a guerrilla war against both British troops 
and Palestinian Arabs.  Consisting of paramilitary groups, the Movement aimed to 
13  
oust the British authority, to allow the unrestricted immigration of Jews, and to 
form a Jewish state (Silver 51). 
 In an attempt to settle the dispute between Jewish nationalists and Arab 
nationalist movements, the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) 
introduced Resolution 181, which was approved on November 28, 1947.  The 
resolution, also known as the United Nations Partition Plan for Palestine, 
terminated the British Mandate and authorized a complete withdrawal of the 
British armed forces.  Furthermore, it outlined the boundaries for the future 
independent Arab and Jewish States and a Special International Regime for the 
City of Jerusalem. While the proposed plan was accepted by the largely migrant 
Jewish community in Palestine, it was rejected by the largely indigenous Arab 
community in Palestine, along with members of the Arab League (A/RES/181 II).  
The Arab League claimed the plan was unbalanced and unfair to the Arab 
population living within the territory, as the amount of land given to the Arabs 
compared to the Jews was noncontiguous, indefensible, and not proportional to 
their population size (A/AC.21/7; See Table A).     
 On May 14, 1948, eight hours before the end of the British Mandate of 
Palestine, David Ben-Gurion declared an independent state of Israel (“The 
Declaration of the State”).  Rejecting this declaration and asserting “that the rule 
of Palestine should revert to its inhabitants, in accordance with the provisions of 
the Covenant of the League of Nations and [the Charter] of the United Nations,” a 
coalition of Arab forces (Egypt, Syria, Transjordan, Lebanon, and Iraq) and 
Palestinian Arab forces responded by attacking Jewish nationalist forces (Arab 
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League 3).  Following a ceasefire on January 7, 1949, protracted peace talks led to 
an armistice agreement that allowed Jewish nationalists to control nearly one-third 
more of the territory than was allocated by the United Nations Partition Plan (See 
Image A).  These Armistice Demarcation Lines eventually became known 
collectively as the “Green Line.”  During the 1948 Arab-Israeli War and the Civil 
War that preceded it, roughly 711,000 to 725,000 Palestinian Arabs left, fled, or 
were expelled from their homes by Zionist forces to ensure a decisive Jewish 
majority in the future state of Israel (McDowall and Claire 10).   
 The armed truce between Jewish Israelis and Palestinian Arabs, 
punctuated by raids and reprisals, lasted until 1956.  When Egyptian President 
Gamal Abdel Nasser nationalized the Suez Canal, Israel - backed by Great 
Britain, the United Kingdom, and France - launched a successful combined air 
and ground assault into Egypt's Sinai peninsula.  Many members of the 
international community condemned this action against Egypt as a Western plot 
to regain control of the canal and remove Nasser from power.  Israel had captured 
several key objectives, including the Gaza Strip and Sharm el Sheikh, which it 
turned over to the UN Emergency Force (UNEF) for guaranteed access to the 
Gulf of Aqaba in 1957 before the eventual ceasefire (Alteras 230-275).  
  A decade later, Israel launched surprise air strikes against the United Arab 
Republic (Egypt, Jordan, and Syria) in what became known as the Six-Day War 
of 1967.  The victory allowed Israel to control the final 22% of Palestine - the 
West Bank, East Jerusalem, and Gaza Strip - along with the Sinai Peninsula of 
Egypt and the Golan Heights of Syria.  On November 22, 1967, UNSC Resolution 
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242 was unanimously adopted, making it illegal to acquire territory by warfare; 
therefore, the United Nations considers the Palestinian territories as being 
“occupied” by Israel (S/RES/242).  
 Since that time, there have been repeated waves of armed or popular 
resistance by Palestinian Arabs against the occupation - notably, two major Arab-
Israeli Wars (the 1973-1974 Yom Kippur War and the 1982 War), the intifada of 
1987-1990, failed peace processes (Oslo Accords, 1993-2000), the intifada of 
2000-2005, Hamas control of Gaza (elections of 2006 and control in 2007), and 
Palestinian militancy (Hamas rocket fire).  Each time, Israel has responded with 
overwhelming military force, repression, and economic sanctions - for example, 
the recent Israeli invasion of Gaza (Operation Cast Lead, December 2008-January 
2009).  Using economic leverage, the Israelis gradually restored relations with 
Palestinians and a relative calm.  However, over the past four decades, any period 
of peace easily reversible.  For the Palestinians living in the occupied territories, 
the outcomes of this pattern have been the steady erosion of development 
potential, the degradation of human capital, the gradual depletion of natural 
resources, and the loss of territory to illegal Jewish settlements (Khalidi and 
Samour 6-7; See Image B).   
 Currently, Jewish settlements are accelerating throughout the occupied 
Palestinian territories.  This colonization deprives Palestinian refugees of their 
national, civil, and human rights.  The failure of an armed struggle campaign has 
led the Palestinian Authority (PA) to adopt an alternative strategy of seeking 
liberation of a fraction of historical Palestine through negotiations and diplomacy.  
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This non-violent strategy has also been futile in achieving Palestinian self-
determination, as the Israeli and Palestinian leaderships are far from reaching an 
agreement on the “final status settlement” by implementing a two-state solution.  
Moreover, neither party has been willing to accept the preconditions posed by the 
other side: Palestinians would have to accept Israel as a Jewish state and Israelis 
would have to place a moratorium on settlement expansion and retreat from the 
illegal settlements (“PM Netanyahu Speech”).  
  Fatah, the ruling political party of the PA, initially integrated its call for 
Palestinian self-determination into the broader anti-colonial struggle that sought 
to establish a “just world order.”  However, once in power, the leadership failed to 
deliver on its promises, and instead secured special privileges for the national 
bourgeoisie and international investor by consolidating power.  Leveraging 
neocolonial power relations, the PA launched neoliberal economic programs 
which promised to deliver “growth” and “prosperity” to their Palestinian 
constituency.  However, this policy failed to challenge the parameters of 
occupation and offered no real strategy for resistance (Khalidi and Samour 7-8; 
See Table B).  Aiming to realize a Palestinian state by mid-2011, the PA recently 
initiated an institution-building plan in hopes that a plea to the United Nations for 
international recognition of statehood would deliver some promising results on 
the ground.  To date, this strategy has failed because of an American threat to veto 
any resolution that would establish Palestine as a member state of the United 
Nations.       
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Palestinian Resolution for Statehood 
 
One day after the Israelis celebrate their Independence Day, known as Yam 
Ha’atzmaut, the Palestinian people commemorate the year of their expulsion - 
known as the Nakba, catastrophe.  However, during the month of commemoration 
in May 2011, President of the PA and member of Fatah, Mahmoud Abbas, gave 
the Palestinian people cause for hope when he announced that Palestinians would 
request that their state be admitted as a full member rather than observer to the 
United Nations.  This request would require the international recognition of the 
State of Palestine on the 1967 border (Abbas 1-3).  
  In a letter to the The New York Times entitled “The Long Overdue 
Palestinian State,” Abbas acknowledged that many people are skeptical of the 
value of such a recognition as the Israeli occupation continues, while others have 
accused him of impeding the peace process.  However, he argues, a state for the 
Palestinian people, which “remains a promise unfulfilled,” has “tremendous value 
for all Palestinians - those living in the homeland, in exile, and under occupation” 
(1).  Abbas argued that Palestine’s admission to the United Nations would “pave 
the way for the internationalization of the conflict as a legal matter, not only as a 
political one,”  and allow Palestine to pursue claims against Israel at the United 
Nations in human rights treaty bodies or the International Court of Justice (1).   
 Currently, the PLO has met all statehood prerequisites listed in the 
Montevideo Convention of 1933, which outlined the rights and duties of states.  
The potential Palestinian state has a permanent population, will have a defined 
territory within the 1967 lines, a government in the form of the PA, and the 
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capacity to enter into relations with other states - notably the 120 of 193 UN 
member states that already recognize the independent state of Palestine, and 
fifteen others that have diplomatic relations with the PA (Khalidi 1).  
Furthermore, intergovernmental organizations such as the World Bank, the 
International Monetary Fund, and the European Union have all indicated that 
Palestinian institutions are currently prepared for statehood, while other 
intergovernmental organizations such as the Arab League and Organization of 
Islamic Cooperation have already admitted Palestine as a full member state 
(Abbas 2). 
  Near the end of his letter, Abbas claimed, “only the occupation of our 
land hinders us from reaching our full national potential; it does not impede 
United Nations recognition” (2).  Once admitted to the United Nations, the 
Palestinian leadership would make the key focus of negotiations on “reaching a 
just solution for Palestinian refugees based on Resolution 194, which the General 
Assembly passed in 1948” (3).  Abbas concluded, “Palestine would be negotiating 
from the position of one United Nations member whose territory is militarily 
occupied by another, however, and not as a vanquished people ready to accept 
whatever terms are put in front of us” (3). 
 This move by the PLO to seek Palestinian statehood at the United Nations 
comes at a time when Palestinians, as a whole, seem to be making a strategic shift 
in their mode of confrontation with Israel.  In their campaign against Israeli 
occupation, Palestinians went from the occasional military attacks toward a more 
nonviolent and political confrontation, as they recognized the lack of impact that 
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armed struggle has had on changing Israeli policies.  This development is further 
influenced by the effective nonviolent protests that were a hallmark of the “Arab 
Spring” of 2011-2012, in which unarmed civilians openly confronted their 
government oppressors.    
 Three clear examples of nonviolent political struggle in support of 
Palestine, as opposed to militarism, have accompanied the Palestinian Authority’s 
bid for statehood.  The first is the two-day symbolic march of Palestinian refugees 
to the borders of Israel to proclaim their right to return to their homes on May and 
June of 2011.  The second is the flotilla of ships that set sail from nearby 
Mediterranean ports to break the Israeli siege of Gaza on July 2011.  The third is 
the continued development of the global movement for a campaign of Boycott, 
Divestment, and Sanctions (BDS) against Israel (Khouri 2).  These campaigns 
send an integrated message that condemns Israel for continuing to act with 
impunity and criminality against the Palestinians, and demonstrates that people 
from around the world are taking action to get Israel to comply with its legal 
obligations.  In the same way that Israel demands respect for the rights of Jews 
and Israelis globally, much of the international community is demanding that 
Israel respect Palestinian rights (Khouri 2).  Even the United States, longtime ally 
of Israel, supports a negotiated two state solution (US State Department).  
 In reality, the statehood bid is not actually a matter of “declaring” 
Palestinian statehood, as the PLO already declared Palestinian independence in 
1988.  Yet, the PLO and PA have never enjoyed sovereignty, jurisdiction, or 
control over the territory of their proclaimed “state” of Palestine.  Moreover, the 
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PA’s legal existence technically lapsed in 1999 in accordance to the Oslo 
Accords, and currently remains under the full authority of Israel as an interim 
self-governing authority (Khalidi 1).  However, international statehood 
recognition of Palestine would place Israelis and Palestinians on a more level 
playing field, where the operating criteria consist of political sovereignty, 
territorial integrity, and non-interference (Treaty of Westphalia). 
 Israel is the only entity within the territory of former Mandatory Palestine 
that has any attributes of sovereignty.  Although Israel has no internationally 
recognized sovereign rights in the occupied territories, it still maintains a de facto 
military jurisdiction and control over them.  Furthermore, Israel does not have any 
serious constraints on its freedom of action, as it has made a norm of routinely 
violating the provisions of the accords with the PLO that were meant to limit 
Israel’s jurisdiction and control (Khalidi 1).  Thus, it is arguable that irrespective 
of how far the PLO gets at the United Nations with its bid, the Palestinians will 
not have a real state of their own in the near future without Israeli withdrawal 
from their territory.  According to the United States, neither the UNGA nor the 
UN Security Council (UNSC) is an appropriate forum for discussing or resolving 
the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.  The United States also rejects UN authority to 
contravene previous agreements signed between the parties and promised to veto 
any UNSC resolution, thereby, blocking Palestine from becoming a member state 
(Levy 1-3).   
 Expected failure of a formal UNSC vote on Palestinian statehood suggests 
that the Palestinian Authority must have an agenda that does not actually involve 
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obtaining UN membership.  While it is possible that the Palestinian leadership is 
using the bound-to-fail statehood bid to create conditions for a new round of 
violence in the form of a third intifada, I argue that a more likely reason for the 
bid is its timing during a period of stalled direct bilateral negotiations.  
Continuous US threats to veto a UNSC resolution on Palestinian membership 
simultaneously backs Palestinian claims of American bias towards Israeli 
interests.  As confidence in American management of the peace process declines 
and American influence in the Middle East wanes, support for the Palestinian 
statehood bid will rise.  Therefore, even if a resolution never goes to vote, 
Palestinians will still gain political leverage in their negotiations with Israel 
during a time in which Israel suffers increasing alienation and isolation by the 
international community.          
  On the other hand, if a Palestinian statehood resolution did eventually 
pass, then the stalled negotiations would receive a “jump start.”  Palestinian UN 
membership as a state would powerfully entrench the two-state solution, upsetting 
many who support a one-state solution to the conflict - namely, the more 
absolutist Palestinian rights camp and those in the Greater Israel settler camp.  
The passage of this resolution would also clarify that the territory of the 
Palestinian state would be based on the 1967 lines, allowing for modifications to 
that line only on the basis of mutually agreed land swaps with East Jerusalem 
serving as its capital (See Table C).  Grounding future negotiations in more 
realistic terms, this resolution would also ensure that the two-state arrangement is 
not endlessly flexible, undermining the Israeli negotiation tactics that only seek to 
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delay any meaningful progress for the Palestinians to establish a viable state by 
changing what Netanyahu refers to as “the facts on the ground” (Massad 1-4).     
 
Occasion for Obama 
  
As the Obama administration’s recent policies on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict 
have suffered negative feedback internationally and domestically, the timing of 
the Palestinian statehood bid, which the administration will veto if it comes to a 
vote, could not be any worse.  In 2010, despite appeals by the Obama 
administration, the Israeli government refused to renew a partial moratorium on 
settlement construction in the occupied Palestinian territories.  Along with the 
recognition that Obama himself would not be able to accomplish anything other 
than merely managing the conflict until the 2012 Presidential elections, Israeli 
settlements were one of the major reasons that the new PA policy of seeking-
statehood became a necessity.  At the time, it was clear that the Israeli Prime 
Minister, Benjamin Netanyahu, was only interested in Israel’s security, as he took 
a rejectionist approach to negotiations, refusing an Israeli withdrawal to the 1967 
lines, and rejecting shared sovereignty in Jerusalem and an Israeli withdrawal 
from the Jordan Valley.  As a result, direct negotiations stalled.     
 Putting aside the US monopoly of the Oslo framework for bilateral 
negotiations, the West Bank’s PA began to craft an alternative policy.  PA 
officials in Ramallah decided it was time to promote nonviolent mass action to 
reclaim sovereignty in the West Bank and to end the schism between Fatah’s 
West Bank and Hamas’ Gaza authorities.  Abbas’ escalated state-building agenda 
and diplomatic offensive at the United Nations to recognize Palestine as a state 
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along the 1967 lines was paired with a move to have the European Union, United 
Nations, and Russia “internationalize” ownership of the negotiations along with 
the United States.  Moreover, Abbas insisted that there will be no further talks 
until there is a settlement freeze and a clear reference to the 1967 lines (Ravid and 
Issacharoff 1).      
 Diplomacy at the United Nations was the priority of the PA agenda over 
the next several months.  In February 2011, Arab nations introduced a UN 
Security Council resolution condemning Israel’s settlement policy as illegal.  
Israeli settlement construction damages the chances for an internationally-backed 
peace plan that would permit the Palestinians to create a viable, contiguous state.  
Despite US support for the applicability of the Geneva Convention to settlements 
in a 1978 State Department legal opinion and past speeches made by President 
Obama and Secretary of State Hillary Clinton criticizing the settlements, the 
United States vetoed the resolution (Skarzynski, Melle, and Byker, 1-5).  The US 
Ambassador to the United Nations, Susan E. Rice, issued a statement explaining 
the vote on the grounds that the United States opposed new Israeli settlements, but 
believed that taking the issue to the UN would only complicate efforts to resume 
stalled negotiations between Israel and the Palestinians on a two-state solution 
(Rice 1).  As a result, Arab countries and Palestinian supporters around the world 
heavily criticized US legitimacy as a mediator in the Israeli-Palestinian 
negotiations.  
 The vetoed resolution had the support of 123 co-sponsors of 192 UN 
member states, and gained the votes of fourteen of the Security Council’s fifteen 
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members (“United States Vetoes” 1).  This vote isolated the United States and 
Israel on one side of the settlement issue, while most of the international 
community was on the other.  Furthermore, the veto triggered a démarche by 
three EU members on the Council.  Although Britain, France, and Germany still 
agreed with the United States that only bilateral negotiations could resolve the 
conflict, they also agreed with the PA that the peace process could not be open-
ended.  Britain, backed by France and Germany, laid down four parameters that 
any future Israeli-Palestinian negotiations would have to meet: borders based on 
the 1967 lines with mutually agreed land swaps; security arrangements that put an 
end to the occupation and simultaneously prevent the resurgence of terrorism; a 
shard capital in Jerusalem; and a just solution to the refugee question (Usher 61).   
 Following Mahmoud Abbas’s acceptance of these parameters as bases for 
negotiations, the démarche prompted President Obama to make a statement 
concerning the Middle East Peace Process in his address on the Arab Spring at the 
State Department on May 19, 2011.  Obama declared, “The borders of Israel and 
Palestine should be based on the 1967 lines with mutually agreed land swaps, so 
that secure and recognized borders are established for both states” (8).  This 
statement received furious backlash from the Israeli government, Republican, and 
other domestic pro-Israel lobbies.  Benjamin Netanyahu, a day before receiving 
three standing ovations during a joint session of Congress, strongly criticized the 
“indefensible” 1967 lines as a basis for negotiations (Netanyahu 1).  This event 
represented the depth of congressional disapproval - Democrat and Republican - 
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of Obama’s Middle-East Policy as being hostile to Israel and exposed the deep 
divide that doomed any US bid to revive peace talks. 
 Presumably fearing the perception of being anti-Israel before the 2012 
Presidential Campaign, Barack Obama has had to intensify his pro-Israel rhetoric 
not only to win Jewish American votes in crucial swing states, but also to secure 
his Jewish constituency’s donations for reelection (Kitfield 1).  While Congress 
passed a resolution in July threatening to block the annual $500 million in aid to 
the PA if statehood membership was pursued, the Obama administration was busy 
using diplomacy to prevent the international community from supporting the 
statehood bid.  Backed by a long-standing US precedent of stating that the UN is 
the wrong forum for addressing a “bilateral” dispute between the Israelis and 
Palestinians, Washington continued to denounce the unilateral Palestinian move 
for self-determination.      
 When the Quartet of the United States, European Union, Russia, and the 
United Nations finally met on July 11, after the State Department cancelled the 
April and May meetings, the United States finally submitted a draft statement for 
the return to negotiations.  However, the statement was so heavily tilted towards 
Israel, it prompted senior European diplomats to reportedly say, “responsibility 
for the failure of the meeting lies with the United States, which proposed .... a 
one-sided wording for an announcement that favored Israel and which had no 
chance of being accepted by the Palestinians” (Ravid 2).  The statement would 
have endorsed two of Israel’s main recent demands: Palestinian acknowledgement 
of Israel as a Jewish state and accommodation of major Israeli settlements on 
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Palestinian territory.  Furthermore, it mentioned that “peace” would not come via 
UN decisions, and that no country could be expected to negotiate with a terrorist 
organization.  There was no reference to a settlement freeze or to mutually agreed 
land swaps (“Report: US sought” 1).     
 Recently, President Obama faced yet another challenge when preparing 
his speech for delivery to the UNGA on September 21, 2011.  As the Head of 
State, he had to declare the US position on the greater Israeli-Palestinian conflict 
along with an implicit response to the looming Palestinian recommendation for 
statehood.  This speech came at a time when the President had a domestic 
approval rating of 41% and suffered fierce opposition from the neoconservative 
right (Gallup 1).  He had to avoid a UN showdown, while simultaneously trying 
to improve US relations with Arab nations.  Summing up the troublesome 
circumstances for President Obama’s preparation for the UNGA speech, Helene 
Cooper, reporting for The New York Times, wrote:  
 For Mr. Obama, the challenge in crafting the much-anticipated General 
Assembly speech was how to address the incongruities of the 
administration’s position: the president who committed to making peace 
between the Israelis and the Palestinians a priority from Day One, now 
unable to get peace negotiations going after two and a half years; the 
president who opened the door to Palestinian state membership at the 
United Nations last year, now threatening to veto that membership; the 
president determined to get on the right side of Arab history but ending up, 
in the views of many Arabs, on the wrong side of it on the Palestinian 
issue (1).   
At the UNGA opening session, all eyes and ears were on Obama to see if his 
speech would represent a historic shift in an unpopular US foreign policy towards 
Israel and Palestine. 
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Obama’s Speech to the UN General Assembly 
  
On September 21, 2011, President Barack Obama delivered his speech to the 
United Nations General Assembly, expressing the US position on various 
contemporary international matters.  This event marked the third time that Obama 
has stood at the podium for the UN General Debate since his first as President in 
2009, with each speech marking a shift in his policy towards the Middle East 
peace process.  Two years ago, he abandoned his call for a freeze of settlements in 
the West Bank, as Israel flatly refused to comply.  Then last year, he delivered an 
impassioned call for Palestinian statehood, to be recognized in the United 
Nations, within the next year.  This year, he tried to acknowledge the newest shift 
in policy, recalling his pledge and his belief that then, as now: although “the 
Palestinians deserve a state of their own ... genuine peace can only be realized 
between Israelis and Palestinians themselves” (1).   
 Standing before UN delegates, Obama went from congratulating the 
democratic movements in the Ivory Coast, Tunisia, and South Sudan, to blocking 
the “Arab Spring’s” manifestation in the Palestinian territories.  Implicitly 
declaring US opposition to the PA’s bid for statehood at the UNSC, Obama 
warned world leaders that trying to create a Palestinian state by decree instead of 
through negotiations was bound to fail in creating peace between the Israelis and 
Palestinians: “Peace will not come through statements and negotiations at the 
United Nations -- if it were that easy, it would have been accomplished by now” 
(6).  Obama argued that a statehood resolution approved over the objection of 
Israel would only make it harder to return to direct peace talks over final borders, 
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the status of Palestinian refugees and their descendants, and the future of 
Jerusalem.  While Mahmoud Abbas could be seen putting his forehead in his hand 
several times throughout the speech, Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu of 
Israel called the speech a “badge of honor” (Cooper 2).    
 This artifact - President Obama’s Speech to the UNGA during the opening 
of the 66th Session - is particularly useful in analyzing how the United States has 
expressed and constructed opposition to the Palestinian statehood resolution for a 
number of reasons.  
•First and foremost, the purpose of a UNGA speech - for a Head of State 
to represent his/her nation’s foreign policy platform - provides the rhetor 
(Barack Obama) a forum to express his ideological positions on various 
international matters, each of which can be analyzed using the tools of 
rhetorical discourse analysis. 
•Secondly, the timing of this speech comes two days before the PA 
submitted its application seeking “state membership,” to the UN Secretary 
General, Ban Ki Moon, on September 23. 
•Thirdly, although Obama did not refer to the resolution explicitly in the 
speech, he mentioned Palestine’s need to find peace with Israel before 
seeking a formal solution through UN decrees.  
•Lastly, this speech provides an overview of the US position on the 
Palestinian resolution for statehood, echoing previous White House and 
State Department Press Releases, and past speeches made by Susan E. 
29  
Rice and Barak Obama regarding the US position on the Palestinian 
resolution for statehood.   
The next section describes the method of rhetorical criticism used to analyze 
Obama’s speech.        
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III. Description of the Method of Analysis 
 
This section articulates the ideological approach to rhetorical criticism by defining 
the method’s key concepts and laying out its basic tenets and procedures.  After 
providing examples of how scholars have contributed to the development of 
ideological criticism in the communications field, I describe how and why I apply 
the method to critique President Barack Obama’s speech to the United Nation’s 
General Assembly.         
 
The Ideological Approach 
 
I use ideological criticism in order to frame my rhetorical analysis.  In her book, 
Rhetorical Criticism: Exploration and Practice, Sonja Foss explains and 
illustrates the theory of ideological criticism and provides various examples of its 
application.  She defines ideology as a “pattern of beliefs that determines a 
group’s interpretations of some aspect(s) of the world” (209).  As a student of 
rhetorical criticism, I am interested in discovering the beliefs, values, and 
assumptions that are suggested beyond the surface structure of an artifact.  Since 
beliefs reflect a group’s “fundamental social, economic, political or cultural 
interests,” conducting ideological criticism allows me to understand the “mental 
framework ... that a group deploys to make sense of and define the world or some 
aspect of it” (van Dijk 69), (Foss 209).   
 As Foss further explains, “the primary components of an ideology are 
evaluative beliefs - beliefs about which there are possible alternative judgments.”  
She illustrates this concept by providing a set of beliefs about the issue of 
immigration such as the following: “too many people come to our country;” 
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“immigrants only come here to live off of welfare;” and “the government must 
send back illegal immigrants.”  These beliefs comprise an ideology around 
immigration that “serve as the foundation for the knowledge, attitudes, motives, 
and predilections of groups that adhere to this ideology.”  Other examples of 
ideologies include nationalism, Islamism, liberalism, and anti-capitalism.   
 There are multiple competing ideologies within any given society, and 
they manifest themselves in rhetorical artifacts.  Some ideologies become more 
privileged, while alternative or oppositional perspectives may be repressed.  As a 
result, the privileged ideologies become hegemonic.  As Sonja Foss elaborates, “it 
thus constitutes a kind of social control, a means of symbolic coercion, or a form 
of domination by more powerful groups over the ideologies of those with less 
power. (Foss 210).  Essentially, inviting “us to understand the world in certain 
ways, but not in others” (O’Connor 36).  Furthermore, these dominant or 
hegemonic ideologies establish social norms by controlling what participants see 
as natural or obvious.  While a hegemonic ideology asserts that its meanings are 
natural and real by providing a sense that things are the way they have to be, any 
viewpoints that challenge this will appear abnormal.   
 Foss cites the Iraq War initiated by the United States in 2003 as an 
example of dominant discourse based on ideology.  Whether or not the United 
States should have invaded Iraq was hotly debated by many different groups and 
individuals such as pacifists, politicians, President George W. Bush, Iraqi citizens, 
each using different perspectives and ideologies reflected in the discourse.  Yet, as 
Foss argues, the “dominant perspective that emerged and functioned as 
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hegemonic was that of the president and his cabinet members” due to their access 
to classified information and their ability to hide or release that information, their 
ability to converse with world leaders, and guaranteed media coverage of their 
words and actions (Foss 210).  Thus, “their perspective became privileged over 
that of other perspectives” (Foss 210).     
 
Contributions  
 
The ideological approach to criticism is constantly developing as communication 
scholars influence it.  Some of the more prominent scholars include Teun A. van 
Dijk, Philip C. Wander, Michael Calvin McGee, Raymie E. McKerrow, Janice 
Hovker Rushing and Thomas S. Frentz, Lawrence Grossberg, Celeste Michelle 
Condit, and Dana L. Cloud.  In their development of ideological criticism, each of 
these scholars have been influenced by a number of different perspectives and 
philosophies, including structuralism, Marxism, postmodernism, cultural studies, 
articulation, and feminism.  
 Michael Calvin McGee, for example, published an essay in 1980 entitled 
“The ‘Ideograph’: A Link Between Rhetoric and Ideology.”  In the beginning of 
his essay, McGee suggests that “ideology in practice is a political language, 
preserved in rhetorical documents, with the capacity to dictate decision and 
control public belief and behavior” (5).  He continues, “the political language 
which manifests ideology seems characterized by slogans, a vocabulary of 
‘ideographs’ easily mistaken for the technical terminology of political 
philosophy” (5).  An “ideograph,” being an abstract word or phrase such as 
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“property” or “rule of law,” provides a naming function within society to select, 
deflect, or reflect a version of reality through symbols.  Furthermore, ideographs 
are used as tools to shape public consciousness through their persuasive power of 
representing valid interpretations of the world.  The author concludes with the 
suggestion that a “complete description of an ideology” should consist of the 
following: 1) “the isolation of a society’s ideographs,” 2) “the exposure and 
analysis of the diachronic structure of every ideograph,” and 3) “characterization 
of synchronic relationships among all the ideographs in a particular context” (16).   
 Using McGee’s interpretation of rhetorical theory, many scholars who 
apply an ideological approach of criticism to their artifact analyze the artifact’s 
use of “ideographs” to draw conclusions about the rhetor and his or her world 
view.  This method allows critics to explore the relationship between rhetoric and 
power.  Examples of ideographs in American political mythology include 
religion, privacy, freedom of speech, property, liberty, and rule of law - terms 
described by McGee as being “more pregnant than propositions ever could be,” as 
each term carries with it a very abstract meaning (7).  The task of the analyst is to 
determine the associations between ideals and national/cultural identities across 
time, and to determine how the ideals have been promoted, appropriated, and 
sublimated, and by whom.   
 This essay represents one of the many ideological approaches to rhetorical 
criticism.  Although various scholars of ideological criticism have embraced 
different perspectives, their primary goal as ideological critics has been to 
“discover and make visible the ideology embedded in an artifact” (Foss 213).  
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Ideological analysis seeks “to explicate the role of communication in creating and 
sustaining an ideology and to discover whose interests are represented in that 
ideology” (Foss 213).  This process provides a “critical distance on existing 
relations, clearing a space in which existing arrangements can be evaluated and 
perhaps altered” (Foss 214).  Conducting an ideological criticism of Obama’s 
UNGA speech is the best approach to use in order to fulfill this project’s primary 
goal of understanding how the United States has constructed an opposition to the 
Palestinian statehood bid.  An ideological critique of the speech not only revealed 
hints as to whose interests it serves, but also provided insight as to where the 
status quo can be altered for the betterment of society.    
 
Application 
 
My analysis follows Sonja Foss’ general guidelines in applying the ideological 
approach of criticism to the artifact.  According to Foss, a critic will follow four 
steps when exploring a rhetorical artifact for the ideology it manifests. The first 
step is the identification of “presented elements” in the artifact that “provide clues 
to its ideology.”  These elements or signs are often the assumptions or premises 
behind the artifact that point to its ideological tenets.  The critic should make a list 
of the presented elements that they code from their artifact.  These elements can 
be anything from particular terms, major arguments, images, metaphors, used in 
the artifact’s text (215).    
 The second step is the identification of “suggested elements.”  To identify 
these, the critic should analyze the list of presented elements and articulate certain 
meanings attributed to them, such as their suggested themes, allusions, concepts, 
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references, or ideas.  These suggested elements are basically the meanings behind 
the presented elements.  To illustrate this step, I use Foss’ example of identifying 
the elements in the Humana Building.  After viewing the building for its presented 
elements, Foss observed that it was made out of granite and had an “L” shape.  
From those presented elements, she was then able to identify the elements that 
they might suggest.  For instance, the granite might represent permanence, 
durability, and wealth, while its “L” shape might reference a tombstone, 
memorial, or even a  cash register.  Although the presented and suggested 
elements should not appear in the essay in actual list form, they will be used as 
tools to help the critic discover the artifact’s ideology (216).   
 The third step, “formulating an ideology,” comes after the critic creates a 
list of an artifact’s suggested elements.  Focusing only on the suggested elements, 
the critic should be able to spot the themes, ideas, or ideational clusters that 
characterize most or all of them.  After grouping the elements into categories and 
organizing them into a coherent framework, the critic should be able to 
“formulate the ideology of [the] artifact clearly and succinctly” (218).  If it takes 
more than one to three sentences to explain the ideology, then the critic has yet to 
discover the “core” idea of the ideology.  Building upon the previous example of 
the Humana Building to illustrate this step, Foss mentions that the suggested 
elements of the building cluster into two major categories - death and wealth.  
After a more detailed ideological analysis of the Humana Building, both Sonja 
Foss and Marla Kanengieter were able to articulate the following ideology: 
 The Humana Building is a memorial to those who have suffered or died 
 becaue of its system of health care - a system that emphasized profit over 
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 charity ... The images of death linked to the Humana Corporation serve as 
 monuments to those whom Humana has served not for reasons of charity 
 but for reasons of profit - and the service has been less than it would have 
 been in a hospital dedicated to care rather than profit (Foss and 
 Kanengieter 220).  
 
 The last step involves “identifying the functions served by the ideology.” 
In this step, the critic’s task is to “discover how the ideology [the critic] 
constructed from the artifact functions for the audience who encounters it and the 
consequences it has in the world” (Foss 220).  When formulating the research 
question it is important for the critic to understand what ideology is manifested in 
the artifact, whose interests are served by the ideology, and the ideology’s 
implications for the environment in which it influences.  Once the critic has 
completed the four steps of analysis, it is time to write the critical essay. 
 Sonja Foss provides sample essays that conduct ideological criticism to 
illustrate this critical process.  One essay, “From the Closet to the Loft: Liminal 
License and Socio-Sexual Separation in Queer Eye for the Straight Guy,” by 
Celeste Lacroix and Robert Westerfelhaus, examines the ideology of Bravo’s 
“unscripted” reality television series, Queer Eye for the Straight Guy.  The 
authors note that the show became very popular, and from a queer theory 
perspective, the series offered “much to celebrate” due to “the visibility of openly 
gay men, the positive way they are represented, and their easy fraternization with 
straight men.”  However, after a close and detailed analysis of the series, the 
authors discovered many causes for critical concern - namely, the reaffirmation of 
the straight/gay dichotomy, the characters’ reinforcement rather than challenge of 
traditional stereotypes, and Queers Eye’s illustration of the construction by the 
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mainstream media of a new version of Closet, “the Loft,” that still functions to 
contain queers and queer sexuality (11-13).            
 Lacroix and Westerfelhaus remind readers of the power that the media has 
in entertaining and informing us while also “offering powerful ritualized 
experiences that draw from and reinforce core social values” (12-13).  The 
authors explain how during each episode, the five homosexual protagonists, 
referred to as the “Fab Five,” are integrated into a straight-man’s life for a limited 
time to provide his wardrobe, physical appearance, or home with a make-over .  
Typically, towards the end of each episode, after salvaging an endangered 
heterosexual relationship by making the man or his place more attractive to his 
female partner, the Fab Five are “ensconced in their well-appointed loft” (13).  
This process is described by the authors as being an “inverted ritual order” which 
“allows queers temporary and controlled access to the cultural mainstream while 
ensuring that they pose no threat of socio-sexual contamination by their continued 
presence there” (13).   
 The authors provide an extensive description and analysis of the themes 
present in Queer Eye such as an inverted rite of passage, a liminal license, and the 
loft as socio-sexual separation.  They conclude that although the airing of a 
television series that celebrates the lifestyle of openly gay men is a positive thing, 
it is equally important for the producers to represent gay characters positively in 
such a way that does not serve to tame and contain queer experience.  By 
discovering the suggested elements, the authors deduce that: 
  Through the socio-sexual distancing they promote, media rituals of the 
 type analyzed here negotiate the tension between the heterosexist social 
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 order and the increased visibility and growing political power of gays.  
 This tension is managed by taming queers - and containing queer 
 experience while seemingly celebrating them (18). 
 
 
Methodology 
 
The artifact being used in this study is Obama’s speech to the UNGA opening of 
the 66th Session.  To engage in critical rhetoric of analysis by unmasking the 
discourse of power, I conducted an ideological criticism of the 846 words that 
Obama used in his speech to address the issues surrounding the Israelis and 
Palestinians.  Performing an ideological analysis, I looked beyond the surface of 
his speech to discover the beliefs, values, and assumptions that it suggests.  
Subsequently, I discovered and made visible the ideology embedded in the artifact 
and explicated the role of communication, which performs to make that ideology 
hegemonic.  As a result of my ideological analysis, I sought to learn whose 
interests are being represented in that ideology.  My purpose was to describe the 
relationships that exist within Obama’s speech and between that speech and its 
context; thereby, calling them into question.  Using Sonja Foss’ rhetorical 
criticism, I provide a critical analysis of the existing relations to enable the 
envisioning of new kinds of relationships.   
 As in Lacroix and Westerfelhaus’ analysis, I followed Sonja Foss’s 
general guidelines for ideological criticism and identified the presented elements 
within Obama’s speech.  To identify these presented elements, I examined the 
various ideographs Obama used to construct an opposition to the Palestinian 
statehood bid.  Furthermore, to aid in discovering any suggested elements, I 
articulated the meanings attributed to the ideographs by contextualizing them.  
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My ideological analysis of Obama’s UNGA speech adds to our knowledge of how 
political speeches support hegemonic ideology; synthesize two polarizing 
positions; advocate a stance in the name of furthering peace; and give legitimacy 
to state institutions as representative entities.  Using ideological criticism to frame 
my rhetorical analysis, I identified the reasoning that Obama’s rhetoric deploys to 
makes sense of and to define the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.  The next section 
reports the results of this analysis.   
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IV. Analysis of Obama’s 2011 UNGA Speech 
 
This section conducts a rhetorical analysis to discover and critique the ideology 
embedded in United States President Barack Obama’s speech to the UNGA 
opening of the 66th Session on September 21, 2011, concerning the Israeli-
Palestinian conflict, and more specifically, the Palestinian Authority’s statehood 
bid.  After I examine the underlying beliefs and narratives that the text of 
Obama’s speech purveys, I evaluate the contribution my analysis makes to 
rhetorical theory.     
 
A Test for Principles and American Foreign Policy 
 
Obama begins his speech on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict by affirming the 
importance of the issue:  
Now, I know, particularly this week, that for many in this hall, there's one 
issue that stands as a test for these principles and a test for American 
foreign policy, and that is the conflict between the Israelis and the 
Palestinians. (3) 
The most important aspect of Obama’s opening statement is his recognition that 
he was addressing the Israeli-Palestinian conflict during a “particular” week.  This 
demonstrates that he was well aware of the Palestinian Authority’s plans to 
submit a resolution seeking Palestinian statehood within the week.  Therefore, 
later in the speech when he describes his administration’s position that “peace will 
not come through statements and resolutions at the United Nations,” Obama was 
specifically referring to the Palestinian Authority’s resolution (3).   
 Furthermore, using the term “test,” Obama is recognizing that the 
international community is critically evaluating certain principles and American 
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foreign policy pertaining to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.  Obama is likely 
referring to the principle of self-determination and democracy behind the notion 
“that each nation must chart its own course to fulfill the aspirations of its people,” 
as he spent the first half of his speech congratulating the recent democratic 
movements that took place across the Arab world (1-3).  The Israeli-Palestinian 
conflict is a test for these principles because both parties want to secure their own 
interests, which are often interpreted as being mutually exclusive.  For example, 
Israel has an interest in preserving its “defensible borders” at the expense of 
Palestinian interest in acquiring more territory for a “viable” future state.  Obama 
later reaffirms this idea when he states, “each side has legitimate aspirations -- 
and that’s part of what makes peace so hard” (4).               
 American foreign policy is also being tested due to the influential US role 
in the Middle East peace process as a member of the Quartet on the Middle East 
(QME).  The United States has a unique diplomatic and sociocultural tie to both 
Israel and the Palestinian territories as it hosts the largest Jewish population 
outside of Israel along with a growing Arab-American population.  In addition, 
Washington has historically provided Israel with the highest amount of military 
and financial assistance of any foreign country due to American perception that 
Israel is a crucial economic and political ally in the oil-rich Middle East.  
However, the United States has recently urged Israel to engage in negotiations 
with Palestinians to resolve the issue of establishing an autonomous Palestinian 
state (Butterworth 1).   
 
 
 42 
From 2010 to 2011: Obama’s Advances and Retreats    
 
Obama continues his speech recalling previous statements he has made 
concerning Palestinian statehood during his September 2010 address to the 
UNGA and May 2011 address to the State Department:    
One year ago, I stood at this podium and I called for an independent 
Palestine. I believed then, and I believe now, that the Palestinian people 
deserve a state of their own. But what I also said is that a genuine peace 
can only be realized between the Israelis and the Palestinians themselves. 
One year later, despite extensive efforts by America and others, the parties 
have not bridged their differences. Faced with this stalemate, I put forward 
a new basis for negotiations in May of this year. That basis is clear. It’s 
well known to all of us here. Israelis must know that any agreement 
provides assurances for their security. Palestinians deserve to know the 
territorial basis of their state. (3) 
To analyze the ideology manifested in Obama’s 2012 UNGA speech, I compare 
his administration's previous positions on Palestinian statehood with his 
administration’s current position.  This comparison demonstrates how his 
administration's position has altered over time.  
 In his September 23, 2010, address to the UN General Assembly during 
the opening of the 65th session, Barack Obama devoted 1,060 words out of his 
4,090 word speech to the Middle East Peace Process.  Acknowledging that many 
were “pessimistic” about the peace process bearing fruit and describing how the 
alternative involved “more blood [being] shed,” Obama stated, “ I refuse to accept 
that future ... each of us must choose the path of peace” (2).  After expressing his 
administration’s support of extending a moratorium on settlement construction, 
stressing the importance of a peaceful reconciliation, and urging Palestinian 
supporters to stop attempting to delegitimize Israel, Obama expressed how we 
should “not let terror, or turbulence, or posturing, or petty politics stand in the 
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way” of resolving the conflict (3).  He closed the speech by suggesting that if we 
“draw upon the teachings of tolerance” and “reach for what’s best within 
ourselves” then “we can have an agreement that will lead to a new member of the 
United Nations - an independent, sovereign state of Palestine” (3).    
 In his May 19, 2011, address to the State Department on the Middle East 
and North Africa, Barack Obama devoted 1,134 words out of his 5,452 word 
speech to the Middle East Peace Process.  Obama began the section of his speech 
referring to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict disagreeing that the peace process 
cannot move forward.  Shortly after, he made a reference to the Palestinian 
Authority’s statehood bid: “For the Palestinians, efforts to delegitimize Israel will 
end in failure. Symbolic actions to isolate Israel at the United Nations in 
September won't create an independent state” (8).  Acknowledging the stalemate 
in Israeli-Palestinian negotiations, Obama embraced the democratic change 
sweeping the Arab world by using stronger language to express his 
disappointment with the lack of fruit bore by the peace process:  
The international community is tired of an endless process that never 
produces an outcome. The dream of a Jewish and democratic state cannot 
be fulfilled with permanent occupation.  Ultimately, it is up to Israelis and 
Palestinians to take action. No peace can be imposed upon them, nor can 
endless delay make the problem go away. (8) 
Obama closed his speech by declaring that negotiations should result in two 
states, with negotiations “based on the 1967 lines with mutually agreed swaps, so 
that secure and recognized borders are established for both states” (9). 
 The “1967 lines” refer to the “Green Line” of demarcation established 
through the 1949 armistice between Israel and its Arab neighbors - Egypt, Jordan, 
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Lebanon and Syria - that ended the 1948 Arab-Israeli war over the establishment 
of the Jewish state.  Roughly 18 years later, Israel captured the West Bank and 
East Jerusalem from Jordan and the Gaza Strip from Egypt as a result of the Six 
Day War.  The Israelis then established an occupation, and allowed Jews to build 
settlements in both territories.  Eventually, in 2005, Israel withdrew troops and 
settlers from the Gaza Strip, which is now run by Hamas, a Palestinian Islamic 
party (“Factbox” 1).  Hamas, historically rejecting peace with Israel, recently 
signed a reconciliation agreement with Fatah, the ruling Palestinian party in the 
West Bank.  Leadership in both Fatah and Hamas call for an establishment of a 
future Palestinian state within the 1967 lines, as an independent Palestine would 
span from the West Bank to the Gaza Strip with East Jerusalem serving as its 
capital (Waxman 2).    
 The concept of “mutually agreed swaps” refers to the criteria that Israelis 
and Palestinians swap territory on either side of the 1967 border.  Israel has an 
interest in annexing territory that contains large settlement populations, as there 
are over 500,000 Jews living in the West Bank and East Jerusalem (Myers and 
Landler 2; “Factbox” 2).  Palestinians seek concession of territory of equal value 
in return.  The specific underlying criteria of these land swaps have progressively 
developed over the past decade, as the ratio of land to be swapped has become 
more egalitarian (See Table B).  
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 Moving on to the topic of security, Obama provided an overview of his 
basis of negotiations that would ensure Israel is able to “defend itself ... by itself 
... against any threat:” 
Provisions must also be robust enough to prevent a resurgence of 
terrorism, to stop the infiltration of weapons, and to provide effective 
border security. The full and phased withdrawal of Israeli military forces 
should be coordinated with the assumption of Palestinian security 
responsibility in a sovereign, non-militarized state (9).   
Obama recognizes that these principles, which ensure that Palestinians have a 
territorial basis for state while Israelis have their basic security concerns met, will 
still not provide a solution to the “wrenching” issue concerning a divided 
Jerusalem and the “emotional” issue concerning Palestinian refugees to return to 
Israel (9).  Still, Obama’s 2011 State Department speech as a whole represented a 
minor adjustment in American policy from suggesting to outlining the ideal 
outcome of negotiations .        
 According to a New York Times article by Mark Lander and Steven Myers, 
officials reported that on the same day Obama was to give his State Department 
speech Israeli PM Netanyahu “held an angry phone conversation” with Secretary 
of State Hillary Clinton “[demanding] that the president’s reference to 1967 
borders be cut” from the speech before deliverance to the State Department (1).  
Although Obama made some last minute changes to his speech that delayed his 
appearance by 35 minutes, White House officials said that Obama did not alter the 
text under Israeli pressure and lobbying efforts (1).  In response, Netanyahu sent 
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out a statement shortly after Obama’s address that said, “Israel believes that for 
peace to endure between the Israelis and Palestinians, the viability of a Palestinian 
state cannot come at the expense of the viability of the one and only Jewish state” 
(1).  In addition, the Israeli Prime Minister later went on to critique Obama’s 
reference to the 1967 lines “which are both indefensible and which would leave 
major Israeli population centers in Judea and Samaria beyond those lines” (1).     
 Netanyahu either must genuinely not have been assured that Israel would 
be secure through Obama’s negotiation principles of “mutually agreed swaps” and 
various security provisions or he must have been concerned with how Obama’s 
rhetoric influenced American policy on the peace process.  Glenn Kessler, 
reporting for The Washington Post, argues that Obama’s State Department 
statements represented a “major shift,” as the 1967 boundaries were no longer just 
a “Palestinian goal” but also “American policy” (3).  Yet, Jeffry Goldberg of the 
Atlantic points out that the Obama’s language use is very similar to that of former 
US President George W. Bush.  While George W. Bush stated that it is 
“unrealistic to expect ... a full and complete return to the armistice lines of 1949," 
Obama’s “mutually agreed swaps” concept would ensure that the boundaries are 
different than those of 1967 and would not be set without Israeli approval (1). 
Furthermore, the idea of “land swaps” would allow what Israelis call Judea and 
Samaria to become a part of the Israeli state.  For these reasons, Jack Tapper’s 
alternative view that Netanyahu’s real concern is not about Obama’s reference to 
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the 1967 lines, but rather the idea that Palestinians can essentially show up at 
negotiations with the 1967 borders as the “American position.”  Reporting for 
ABC News, Tapper asserts, “[Obama’s] position essentially gives the Palestinians 
an achievement at the bargaining table without having conceded anything in 
return" (1).       
 While delivering his address to a joint session of the US Congress the very 
next day, Netanyahu stated his agreement with Obama that “the [Israeli-
Palestinian] border will be different than the one that existed on June 4th, 1967” 
(5).  However, Netanyahu did not mention Obama’s criteria that negotiations 
include “mutually agreed swaps,” which raises the following question: where 
does Netanyahu believe lines would have to be drawn to provide Israel with 
“defensible” borders?  While insisting that “Israel will be generous on the size of 
a Palestinian state,” there is a possibility that Netanyahu has an intent to annex 
resource-rich Palestinian land in the West Bank containing large and populous 
Jewish settlements without any reciprocation to the Palestinians (5).  Palestinian 
leadership would not realistically be able to concede this land, which they find 
necessary for the viability of a future state.  As a result, the peace process would 
be further stalled, and the Israeli occupation of Palestinian territories would 
continue.   
 Interestingly, Obama satisfied Netanyahu’s desire for omission of 
references to “1967 lines with mutually agreed swaps” in his 2011 UNGA speech.  
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Instead of explicitly reaffirming the criteria he laid down four months earlier, 
Obama merely stated that the “basis is clear” and “it’s well known to all of us 
here,” as previously quoted (3).  This “voldemoritification” of the concept of 
“mutually agreed swaps,” as a topic that can be referred to but not explicitly 
mentioned, is unwarranted given the conclusion made by Middle East analysts 
that the borders of a new Palestinian state would inevitably be based on Israel’s 
boundaries before the 1967 Arab-Israeli war (Lander and Myers 2).    
 In comparison, Obama’s three speeches over the course of a year--
September 2010 UNGA, May 2011 State Department, and September 2011 
UNGA--do not signal a major shift in America foreign policy.  Although Obama 
used more colorful rhetoric expressing his frustrations with the past failures of the 
peace process in his May 2011 speech than his September 2010 speech, he still 
made it clear that the United States will oppose the Palestinian statehood bid at 
the United Nations.  Yet, he significantly toned down his rhetoric in his 2011 
UNGA speech concerning the prospects for a Palestinian state to be established in 
the near future.  Moreover, Obama only referenced his basis of negotiations for a 
viable two-state solution, while simultaneously omitting the phrasing “1967 lines 
with mutually agreed swaps” to accommodate hardline pro-Israeli supporters.      
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The Palestinian Statehood Bid: Enemy of Peace?    
In the next part of his speech, Obama constructs his opposition to the Palestinian 
Authority’s statehood bid while framing the argument that statements and 
resolutions at the United Nations will not establish peace:      
Now, I know that many are frustrated by the lack of progress. I assure you, 
so am I. But the question isn’t the goal that we seek -- the question is how 
do we reach that goal. And I am convinced that there is no short cut to the 
end of a conflict that has endured for decades. Peace is hard work. Peace 
will not come through statements and resolutions at the United Nations -- 
if it were that easy, it would have been accomplished by now. Ultimately, 
it is the Israelis and the Palestinians who must live side by side. 
Ultimately, it is the Israelis and the Palestinians -- not us –- who must 
reach agreement on the issues that divide them: on borders and on 
security, on refugees and Jerusalem. (3) 
These comments on Israeli-Palestinian peace are the most important to analyze in 
order to understand the reasoning Obama deploys to make sense of and define the 
Israeli-Palestinian conflict, and more specifically, the Palestinian bid for 
statehood.  
 Relying on repetition, Obama made the ideograph “peace” the controlling 
term throughout his speech concerning the Middle East and expressed the 
difficulty of establishing peace.  Even before he got to the topic of the Israeli-
Palestinian conflict, Obama stated “Let us remember: Peace is hard.  Peace is 
hard” as a segue into a discussion about the Arab states currently facing political 
instability - namely, Iran, Syria, Yemen, and Bahrain (3).  Also, once he began to 
allude to the Palestinian statehood issue, Obama asserted, “there is no shortcut to 
the end of a conflict that has endured for decades.  Peace is hard work” (3).  And 
finally, the last comment he made in his speech concerning the conflict was 
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“There are no shortcuts.  And that is what the United Nations should be focused 
on in the weeks and months to come” (4).  
 In summary, Obama said “peace is hard” three times, reminded his 
audience twice that “there are no shortcuts,” and noted that the conflict “has 
endured for decades.”  Ironically he spoke these words in the same room where he 
previously assured his audience that peace could be only a year away.  
Furthermore, this speech sounded like a confession that resolving the conflict 
involves more than just simply “not [letting] terror or turbulence, or posturing or 
petty politics stand in the way,” a claim he made a year prior (3).  By repeatedly 
expressing the complexity and difficulty in establishing a comprehensive peace 
between the Israelis and Palestinians, Obama systematically attempted to 
persuade his audience that only through direct negotiations would both parties 
reach an “agreement on the issues that divide them” (3).   
 In his article, “Palestine Goes to the UN,” Khalid Elgindy provides an 
alternative view that “negotiations with Israel [are] already at a dead end,” and 
should the statehood bid fail or be defeated, “many Palestinians might conclude 
that no peaceful options remain” (8).  He suggests that the PA statehood bid is 
designed to achieve political legitimacy in the country, to strengthen international 
support, and to increase influence in negotiations with Israel.  The UN statehood 
strategy’s roots lie in the Palestinian belief “that two decades of ‘peace 
processing’ have failed to realize Palestinian national aspirations and have helped 
prolong and deepen Israel's occupation while weakening Palestinian political 
institutions” (3).  Palestinian leadership has concluded that the United States and 
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its international partners have failed to live up to their end of the bargain, while 
the Palestinians have done everything that was asked of them, such as continuing 
peace talks, enhancing security, and building institutions (Elgindy 3).   
 Although politically Abbas could not afford another round of failed peace 
talks, in September 2010, he eventually relented to US pressure and agreed to 
enter direct talks as long as Israel placed a moratorium on settlement construction 
and provided clear terms of reference.  Eventually, the Palestinian Authority 
decided to change course radically as a result of the two following events: the 
rapid collapse of peace talks due to Washington’s failure to even partially halt 
Israeli settlement construction and the fall of Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak 
in February 2011.  As a prerequisite to ending the Israeli occupation, Hamas and 
Fatah signed a national reconciliation agreement that “helped eliminate another 
hurdle to [Abbas’ statehood] bid: a still-divided Palestinian polity would not have 
been a credible candidate for statehood” (Elgindy 4).  Although Hamas is 
considered a terrorist group by both Israel and the United States, both states 
should welcome this development for its potential to further peace prospects.  The 
best way to prevent Hamas from engaging in violence is to give it a seat in 
government, as they will now have something to lose - political power, popular 
support, and patronage (Waxman 1).   
 To illustrate his claim that peace would only come through “compromise 
among people who must live together,” Obama used the “lessons” of Northern 
Ireland and Sudan as grounds expressing how reconciliation and negotiations 
have previously led to peace.  Of course, while Northern Ireland has experienced 
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a relative calm, North and South Sudan, on the other hand, have recently drawn 
closer to a full-scale war over disputes concerning borders and the sharing of oil 
revenue (Onyiego 1).  Obama, therefore, provided examples that can serve 
simultaneously as both argumentative and supportive evidence of his assertion 
that successful negotiations establish lasting peace.  In addition, Obama 
subsequently took another risk of acting as a “devil’s advocate” to his own 
arguments.  While supporting his claim that the conflict has endured for decades, 
he implicitly recognized the unjust impact this ongoing conflict has had on the 
Palestinian population: “There’s no question that the Palestinians have seen [the 
vision of statehood and self-determination] delayed for too long” (4).  This 
decade-long delay is the primary reason that the Palestinians are going to submit a 
resolution to the UNSC asking for UN membership as a state.  Once the 
resolution is introduced to the international body, Palestinians will be able to 
jumpstart the peace process with Israel, as they will gain the political leverage 
needed to ensure that negotiation will provide them with a viable state.                  
 Why did Obama dedicate so much time to persuade his audience to accept 
an idea that most people probably perceive as being a truism - specifically, the 
idea that two parties in agreement are not in conflict?  Why did Obama do so little 
to support the most significant claim of his speech opposing the Palestinian 
statehood bid - specifically, the claim that “Peace will not come through 
statements and resolutions at the United Nations” (3). By asserting that the 
Palestinians are using the wrong forum in their attempt to resolve their conflict 
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with Israel at the United Nations, Obama confirmed the American double 
standard that favors Israeli self-determination over that of the Palestinians.     
 Three contradictions exist within the ideology that the Palestinians UN 
statehood bid is a threat to diplomacy and peace.  First of all, the purpose of the 
United Nations is to serve as an arena for conflict resolution by means of 
diplomacy.  Secondly, the Palestinian leadership has made a powerful statement 
by rejecting terrorism and declaring a determination to live in peace alongside 
Israel by taking their case to the United Nations.  Third, it was originally through 
the UN General Assembly that the Jews of Palestine were able to become Israelis 
(Rosenburg 3).  For reference, Israel’s declaration of independence states: 
On the 29th November, 1947, the United Nations General Assembly 
passed a resolution calling for the establishment of a Jewish State in Eretz-
Israel; the General Assembly required the inhabitants of Eretz-Israel to 
take such steps as were necessary on their part for the implementation of 
that resolution. This recognition by the United Nations of the right of the 
Jewish people to establish their State is irrevocable. ..... This right is the 
natural right of the Jewish people to be masters of their own fate, like all 
other nations, in their own sovereign State (“The Declaration of the 
Establishment”).  
Of course, the United States voted in favor of this Israeli resolution, recognizing 
the right of the Jewish people to establish a state. 
 In fact, there are many similarities between the Israeli statehood bid of 
1947 and the Palestinian statehood bid of 2011.  According to foreign policy 
expert MJ Rosenberg, “Attempts at negotiations failed.  The Palestinian 
leadership in the late 1940s was dominated by extremists who had no interest in 
compromise with the Jews.  The Israeli leadership today is similarly inflexible” 
(Rosenberg 1).  The United States is contradicting the historical precedent it set of 
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voting in favor of an Israeli resolution for statehood (at the expense of Arab 
opposition and peace) by currently opposing the Palestinian resolution for 
statehood.   
 Furthermore, alluding to the impact that the PA’s UN effort has on 
furthering peace, Obama asserted, “if it were that easy, it would have been 
accomplished by now” (3).  This idea undermines the realities of US influence in 
the United Nations and the nature of the conflict.  All it takes for the Palestinians 
to gain UN membership as a state is nine of fifteen affirmative votes in the UN 
Security Council with no P5 veto and two-thirds of UNGA concurs.  If it were not 
for a US veto threat and staunch US opposition, the Palestinians would be able to 
have their resolution passed.  In addition, as previously argued, the peace process 
will be furthered once the Palestinian’s gain UN membership.  Obama, instead, 
perpetuated a non-peaceful status-quo by telling the Palestinians, who live under a 
violent and humiliating occupation, that their only hope of ever gaining a state of 
their own is by going back to the stalled negotiations.  Unfortunately, peace will 
not come from bilateral negotiations given the power imbalance between the two 
parties, especially, when members of the Israeli leadership, who have an interest 
in continuing the occupation of Palestinian land, get the final say in the outcomes 
of negotiations.   
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A One-Sided Narrative 
 
Julian Borger, writing in his “Global Security” blog for The Guardian, explained, 
“A good measure of the emotional slant of any speech on the Israel-Palestine 
question is the relative weight given to Jewish and Arab suffering.  By that 
measure, the needle on Obama's [2011 UNGA] speech was far over to one side” 
(1).  Obama’s speech was so biased towards the Israeli narrative about the conflict 
that the ultra-right wing Israeli Foreign Minister, Avigdor Liberman, said he 
could “sign on to that speech with both hands” (“Netanyahu, Lieberman Praise” 
1).  The line of Obama’s 2011 UNGA speech that sounded as though it could 
have been written by a publicist for the Israeli government drew the most 
criticism in the Arab world: 
America’s commitment to Israel’s security is unshakeable. Our friendship 
with Israel is deep and enduring. And so we believe that any lasting peace 
must acknowledge the very real security concerns that Israel faces every 
single day.  Let us be honest with ourselves: Israel is surrounded by 
neighbors that have waged repeated wars against it. Israel’s citizens have 
been killed by rockets fired at their houses and suicide bombs on their 
buses. Israel’s children come of age knowing that throughout the region, 
other children are taught to hate them. Israel, a small country of less than 
eight million people, look out at a world where leaders of much larger 
nations threaten to wipe it off of the map. The Jewish people carry the 
burden of centuries of exile and persecution, and fresh memories of 
knowing that six million people were killed simply because of who they 
are (4).     
This statement led Hanan Ashrawi, a senior member of the PLO delegation in 
Washington, to exclaim, “Listening to [Obama], you would think it was the 
Palestinians who occupy Israel” (“Netanyahu, Lieberman Praise” 1). 
 In this speech, Obama gave a classic justification, including a token 
Holocaust reference, for Israeli occupation and exploitation of the Palestinian 
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territories.  By employing such rhetoric, he sounded less like a liberal Democrat 
and more like a conservative Republican when he appealed to the far right in the 
Christian Zionist and Jewish communities.  As a consequence, Obama has eroded 
America’s image in the Middle East, as Arabs generally understand the nature of 
the conflict and realize when content, especially concerning the adverse impact 
this conflict has on the lives of the Palestinians, is being omitted from Obama’s 
speech (Plitnick 1-2).  Here, Obama made no mention of the violent Israeli 
military occupation of Palestinian territories and its associated restraints on the 
Palestinian economy, the Israeli separation barrier in the West Bank, the Israeli 
construction of settlements on land that is suppose to become part of a future 
Palestinian state, and the degradation of Palestinian natural resources. 
 These conditions are well-documented.  A report by the United Nations 
Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) expresses how the Israeli 
occupation perpetuates the poor economic situation within the Palestinian 
Territories.  These include jobless economic growth driven by foreign aid, an 
erosion of manufacturing capacity, and broad economic divergence between Gaza 
and the West Bank.  UNCTAD also reports a high level of poverty and food 
insecurity, a deepened isolation from global markets caused by the separation 
barrier, heavy dependence on trade with Israel, and a worsening trade deficit.  
UNCTAD further observed high fiscal vulnerability despite austerity measures, 
fiscal instability aggravated by a withholding of Palestinian Authority custom 
clearance revenues, and a loss of Palestinian revenue due to indirect imports from 
Israel (1-16).   
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 A survey conducted by the World Food Programme, the Food and 
Agricultural Organization, and the Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics 
illustrates the desperation caused by this poor economic situation on Palestinian 
individuals:  
The most commonly used strategy for households to cope with economic 
crisis is to defer the payment of utility bills, to purchase food on credit, 
consume lower quality food and consume lower quantities of food. Forty-
three percent of households reported deferring payment of utility bills and 
42 percent of households reported purchasing food on credit. The third 
highest reported coping strategy is consuming lower-quality food (32 
percent) followed by consuming less food (29 percent). Most of these 
coping strategies, even if they are reversible, can have a permanent cost on 
lives and livelihoods through poorer health and nutritional status, 
excessive indebtedness and loss of future opportunities for higher skills 
and better paid jobs (16).  
All of these issues confronting the Palestinians are linked to their political 
situation impacted by Israeli occupation.  While trade is disrupted by checkpoints, 
the separation wall, and general restriction on the movement of people and goods, 
attempts to reduce poverty are “hampered by stagnant trade and and compounded 
by the unpredictability of Israel’s relinquishing of customs moneys owed to the 
Palestinians” (Glennie 2).   
 Another pressing issue for the Palestinian people living in the West Bank 
and Gaza Strip is the deficit in their fresh water supply (Al-Agha and Mortaja 
157-160).  This makes the population more dependent on contaminated 
wastewater.  As a result, pathogenic microorganisms and chemicals in the water 
increase their chances of contracting a water-borne disease.  The health 
implications of contraction are vast and detrimental to the health of the population 
as a whole, as they can suffer from either acute, chronic, or infectious health 
effects (Alfarra and Lubad 1-4).  Unfortunately, the problem is getting worse over 
 58 
time as infrastructure deteriorates and health services are close to collapse.  
Moreover, Israel is neglecting its duties under Hague and Geneva Conventions as 
an occupying power, and in many cases its practices and policies have been 
harmful and abusive (Amnesty International, 2009).       
 All of these issues caused by Israeli occupation not only have an adverse 
on the Palestinian population’s health and material wellbeing but also 
systematically deteriorate Palestinian hopes for self-determination.  These 
conditions explains the sense of urgency that defines the current Palestinian 
struggle and the resulting Palestinian militancy.  While Obama alluded to the 
merits of Palestinian statehood based on human rights, history, sovereignty and 
justice, he never mentioned that without a viable state, Palestinian men, women, 
and children will stay impoverished and subjected to the violence and humiliation 
caused by occupation.   
 
 
Results of the Findings of the Analysis  
 
The peace process between the Israelis and Palestinians have been stagnant over 
the past two years.  Mutual distrust and blame is the outcome from the formerly 
cooperative spirit of the Oslo Process during the 1990s and from two rounds of 
failed serious permanent status negotiations during the last decade.  Neither the 
Israeli nor the Palestinian people benefit from this stalemate.  For the Israelis, it 
energizes radicals on both sides of the conflict, fuels anti-Israeli sentiment, harms 
Israel’s international status, and jeopardizes Israel’s alliances.  For the 
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Palestinians, the stalemate has meant a continued occupation, a stagnant 
economy,  a deterioration of natural resources, and a lack of self-determination.   
 Unfortunately, the current Israeli leadership has resisted efforts to break 
the deadlock in negotiations.  For example, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin 
Netanyahu has refused US President Barack Obama’s request that Israel extend 
its settlement freeze.  This refusal has not only harmed Israel’s relations with its 
most important ally but also paints itself as an obstacle to peace.  Israel now risks 
having a final settlement imposed on it by the international community.   
 The Palestinian leadership, on the other hand, have decided to go to the 
United Nations and introduce a resolution seeking statehood.  Many Palestinians 
view the statehood bid as a diversion and a means to improve the PA 
administration's image, which is currently seen as corrupt and compromising 
(Elgindy 5).  However, this move to upgrade Palestine’s status is actually a part of 
a larger process of gaining recognition through intergovernmental institutions so 
that international law will play a larger role in resolving the conflict.  If both the 
United States and Israel supported the resolution, this could jump start the peace 
process, strengthen the possibility of a two-state solution, and greatly improve 
Israel’s position in the region.  Instead, Israel has rejected the statehood bid and 
the Obama Administration has supported this rejection.           
 Israel’s current leadership considers the PA’s resolution a threat to its 
strategic interests in the country.  Netanyahu would prefer not to have the United 
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Nations declare that Israel was occupying another sovereign state rather than 
some vague entity.  If Palestine were to become a state, Israel would then have to 
commence negotiations over borders, security arrangements, refugees, holy 
places, and its withdrawal from the West Bank.  This prospect would undermine 
Netanyahu’s ability to seize more Palestinian land and to continue building 
settlements on the occupied West Bank.  
 The current US leadership is politically handcuffed to oppose the PA 
resolution by the powerful pro-Israel lobby, which pursues only right-wing 
interests rather than those of Palestinians, Israelis, or Americans.  Also, the 
American media has been extremely sympathetic to Israel’s positions on 
contested questions.  In this context, Obama had to construct an opposition to the 
Palestinian statehood bid during his address to the UNGA.  Recognizing how the 
political climate in the country has made a general American audience susceptible 
to be misled by a one-sided narrative, Obama was able to deliver a speech that 
provided numerous examples of the hardships that Israelis face from Arab 
violence while overlooking Israel’s violations of international law.  As a result, 
Obama assured US voters of his “unshakable” commitment to support America’s 
“deep and enduring friendship” with Israel (4).   
 Both Israel and the United States risk suffering negative consequences as a 
result of their rejection of Palestine’s statehood bid.  Israel could see increased 
Palestinian unrest and violence, which would force Israel to respond in a way that 
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deepens its international isolation and paves the way for boycotts and sanctions on 
Israeli goods and companies.  The United States could face similar international 
isolation and have its role as an objective mediator in the peace process 
denounced.  Moreover, the historic transition taking place in the Middle East from 
western-friendly dictatorships to Islamic democracies makes the position of Israel 
and the United States more precarious than ever in Arab states.   
 Although a full-blown “Palestinian spring” has yet to come, many 
Palestinians communities have held demonstrations and protests opposing the 
separation barrier and the encroachment of Israeli settlements.  Not only do they 
continue to endure the ordeal of occupation, but also they lose land, lose control 
over East Jerusalem, and suffer from the confiscation of residency permits and 
house demolitions.  This experience makes it very hard for them to support a 
negotiated end to the conflict.       
 Khaled Elgindy argues, “Like their counterparts in other Arab countries, 
the [Palestinian people] are more loyal to principles and ideals than to ideological 
and factional affiliations; they seek not statehood but freedom, not negotiations 
but rights” (5).  The Palestinian people are not tied down to the peace process nor 
the two-state solution.  If the situation does not change soon, then they will begin 
to direct their anger at their own leaders.  Thus, Mahmoud Abbas would have to 
chart a new course, which involves finding the courage to abandon the US 
mediated peace-process.  The Palestine Authority would have to 
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“internationalize” the conflict by allowing more state actors such as Britain, 
France, and Brazil to have a larger role in directing the path of negotiations.  If the 
statehood bid fails, then the Palestinian Authority would no longer be able to sub-
contract the Israeli occupation, and instead would have to take a more active role 
in the resistance.  The future of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict remains uncertain.     
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V. Brief Update on Palestine’s Bid Following Obama’s Speech 
 
 
Fulfilling his promise, on September 23, 2011, PA President Mahmoud Abbas 
submitted a formal application for the Palestinian Authority to become a full 
member state of the United Nations.  In his speech to a packed General Assembly, 
Abbas declared “This is a moment of truth.  Our people are waiting to hear an 
answer from the world.  Will it allow Israel to occupy us for ever” (1).  This bid 
marked the beginning of a new PLO policy that is fed up with the failure of the 
Oslo Peace Process, Israeli settlement expansion, constant occupation, and denial 
of Palestinian access to land and holy places.  Although negotiations with Israel 
still remains the first option of the PLO, its failure to provide an agreement has 
compelled the PLO to preserve the only remaining opportunity for a just and 
peaceful end to the conflict by turning to the international community for 
assistance.  Abbas claimed, “the choice is not between Palestinian unity or peace 
with Israel; it is between a two-state solution or settlement-colonies” (2). 
 Although the Obama administration had made clear that it would veto the 
application in the Security Council, it may not need to, as it is still questionable 
whether the PA can secure enough “yes” votes in the council.  In order to force a 
vote, it would need nine out of the available fifteen.  The United States has been 
using diplomatic leverage to ensure that the Palestinians do not gain the last 
crucial votes in order to stall a vote on the resolution.  When the Palestinian 
Authority first introduced the resolution, China, Russia, India, Lebanon, South 
Africa, Brazil, and Portugal supported it, United States, Germany, and Colombia 
opposed it, and France, Britain, Gabon, Nigeria, and Bosnia-Herzegovina were 
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ambivalent (Myers and Kirkpatrick 2-3).  Thus, the Palestinian Authority needed 
to gain two more votes.  Regardless of the Security Council blockade, the PA can 
invoke the “Uniting for Peace” framework.  While the Uniting for Peace 
Resolution has been used to authorize peace operations in the face of UN 
deadlock, it has not yet been used for a question of admitting a member state to 
the United Nations.  This maneuver would allow the Palestinian Authority to turn 
to the 193-member General Assembly, where a veto cannot be issued.  Within this 
deliberative, policymaking, and representative organ of the United Nations, the 
PA has enough votes to approve an upgrade in its UN status from observer to a 
nonmember observer state, similar to the status of the Vatican.  This upgrade 
would give the “state” of Palestine important rights that would strengthen 
Palestine’s claim to International Criminal Court jurisdiction over the occupied 
territories.  
 Palestinian resolve was greatly enhanced on November 3, 2011, when the 
United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) 
accepted Palestine as a member state following a 107-14 vote (Laurenti 1).  This 
development illustrates that Palestinians, despite the occupation of their territory, 
are getting approval from the international community of their claim of a right of 
self-determination and representation.  A major concern of the United States and 
Israel is that this membership in UNESCO could set a “slippery slope” precedent 
of Palestine being treated as a state by the World Health Organization and other 
various parts of the UN system.  The United States has marginalized itself in the 
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diplomatic area once again and has eroded its “soft power” capacity (Rosenberg 
2).     
 However, the most damaging impact of the UNESCO decision to US 
interests are two laws, enacted in the early 1990s, that prohibit the United States 
from providing financial contributions to any United Nations entity that admits 
Palestine as a member.  Withholding $60 million of funds from UNESCO reveals 
how US interests and those of the Israeli government are at a crossroads.  While it 
is a symbolic act for the Israeli government to deny recognition of Palestine at any 
forum without its permission, the ability of the United States to advance its 
interests and promote its ideals is at risk through the withdrawing of funds from 
important UN agencies because its members recognize Palestine (Rosenburg 2).  
Moreover, it is likely that Palestine will eventually receive admission into several 
other UN bodies such as the World Health Organization (WHO) and the 
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), both of which the United States 
currently uses as a tool to advance its interests around the world (Laurenti 1-2).  
While the WHO protects Americans from potential pandemics like the avian flu, 
the IAEA restrains Iranian and North Korean nuclear weapon development 
(Rosenberg 2).  If the United States were to cut funding to these organizations, it 
would lose its leverage to influence policy that directly affects its national 
security.      
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Appendices 
 
Table A. Representation of the figures given for the distribution of the settled 
population in the two proposed States, as estimated on the basis of official figures 
up to the end of 1946. (Data from UNSCOP Report of 1947 - A/364) 
 
Territory Arab and 
other 
population 
 % Arab 
and 
other 
Jewish 
population 
 % 
Jewish 
Total 
population 
Arab State 725,000 99% 10,000 1% 735,000 
Jewish State 407,000 45% 498,000 55% 905,000 
International 105,000 51% 100,000 49% 205,000 
Total 1,237,000 67% 608,000 33% 1,845,000 
 
 
 
Table B. Overview of Israeli Redeployments in the Occupied Territories.  
(“Israeli Redeployments in the Occupied Territories”) 
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Table C. Review of recent land swap proposals from 2000-2008.   
(“Land Swaps - A Review of Recent Proposals”) 
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Image A. Illustration of Jewish and Arab territory before and after the armistice 
agreement. (Palestinian Academic Society for the Study of International Affairs) 
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Image B. Illustration of established and evacuated Israeli settlements in the West 
Bank and Gaza Strip from 1967-2008. (Jan de Jong) 
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Summary of Capstone Project 
 
 In May 2011, President of the PA and member of Fatah, Mahmoud Abbas, 
announced that Palestinians would request that their state be admitted as a full 
member rather than observer to the United Nations (Abbas 1-3).  This request 
would require the international recognition of the State of Palestine on the 1967 
border.  This move to seek Palestinian statehood at the United Nations came at a 
time when Palestinians, as a whole, seemed to be making a strategic shift in their 
mode of confrontation with Israel.  In their campaign against Israeli occupation, 
Palestinians went from the occasional military attacks toward a more nonviolent 
and political confrontation, as they recognized the lack of impact that armed 
struggle has had on changing Israeli policies.  This development is further 
influenced by the effective nonviolent protests that were a hallmark of the “Arab 
Spring” of 2011-2012, in which unarmed civilians openly confronted their 
government oppressors.    
 The United States threatened to use its veto power, as a permanent 
member of the United Nations Security Council (UNSC), to block any Palestinian 
resolution seeking statehood (Rogin 1).  The Obama administration's foreign 
policy on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict has been heavily criticized on both sides 
of the political spectrum.  The left, and some international European and Middle 
Eastern allies, have called him out on his double standard approach of supporting 
self-determination and resistance movements in Tunisia, Egypt, and Libya, but 
not in the Occupied Palestinian Territories.  The right, on the other hand, has 
accused him of not being supportive enough of Israel (Shapiro 2).  The current 
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official United States position is that Palestinian statehood should not be 
determined by the United Nations; rather, it is a subject for direct bilateral 
negotiations between the Israelis and Palestinians (Rogin 1).    
 To succeed in American presidential politics, candidates must express the 
importance of Israel as a strategic American ally and reaffirm their commitment 
to Israel’s perceived security interests.  A candidate's stalwart support for the 
State of Israel is important not only to Jewish-American voters who have 
emotional and/or familial ties to the state, but also to evangelical Christians who 
largely support the state out of theological obligation.  Basically, to win votes and 
to secure a large source of campaign donations, he should use any opportunity 
that presents itself to wrap himself in an Israeli flag - metaphorically speaking - 
whether during a televised debate or on the campaign trail.  For powerful lobby 
groups in Washington, the strong backing of Israel is nothing short of a litmus test 
(Kitfield 1).   
 On September 21, 2011, US President Barack Obama addressed the 
United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) during the opening of the 66th 
session by covering a wide range of international issues.  He focused on the so-
called “Arab Spring,” the controversial issue of the Palestinian statehood bid, 
nuclear weapons and disarmament, and lastly, wider socioeconomic issues such as 
education and human rights.  For Obama, a first-term president with a low 
approval rating and little more than a year left before the 2012 presidential 
campaign, this speech at the UNGA, just like every other high-profile one, was a 
campaign speech (Hechtkopf 1). 
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   I conducted an ideological critique on the 846 words that Obama used to 
frame and construct an opposition to the Palestinian Authority’s plans to submit a 
formal resolution seeking statehood and full membership status to the United 
Nations Security Council.  To conduct this ideological analysis, I consulted 
Rhetorical Criticism: Exploration and Practice by Sonja Foss.  Sonja Foss’s work 
explains and illustrates the theory of ideological criticism and provides various 
examples of its application.  She defines ideology as a “pattern of beliefs that 
determines a group’s interpretations of some aspect(s) of the world” (209).  Since 
beliefs reflect a group’s fundamental social, economic, political or cultural 
interests, conducting ideological criticism allows me to understand the mental 
framework that Obama deploys to make sense of and define the Israeli-Palestinian 
conflict. 
 This artifact - President Obama’s Speech to the UNGA during the opening 
of the 66th Session - is particularly useful in analyzing how the United States has 
expressed and constructed opposition to the Palestinian statehood resolution for a 
number of reasons.  First and foremost, the purpose of a UNGA speech - for a 
Head of State to represent his/her nation’s foreign policy platform - provides the 
rhetor (Barack Obama) a forum to express his ideological positions on various 
international matters, each of which can be analyzed using the tools of rhetorical 
discourse analysis.  Secondly, the timing of this speech comes two days before the 
PA submitted its application seeking “state membership,” to the UN Secretary 
General, Ban Ki Moon, on September 23.  Thirdly, although Obama did not refer 
to the resolution explicitly in the speech, he mentioned Palestine’s need to find 
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peace with Israel before seeking a formal solution through UN decrees.  Lastly, 
this speech provides an overview of the US position on the Palestinian resolution 
for statehood, echoing previous White House and State Department Press 
Releases, and past speeches made by Susan E. Rice and Barak Obama regarding 
the US position on the Palestinian resolution for statehood.   
 Performing an ideological analysis, I looked beyond the surface of his 
speech to discover the beliefs, values, and assumptions that it suggests.  
Subsequently, I discovered and made visible the ideology embedded in the 
Obama’s speech and explicated the role of communication, which performs to 
make that ideology hegemonic.  As a result of my ideological analysis, I sought to 
learn whose interests are being represented in that ideology.  My purpose was to 
describe the relationships that exist within Obama’s speech and between that 
speech and its context; thereby, calling them into question.  Using Sonja Foss’ 
rhetorical criticism, I provide a critical analysis of the existing relations to enable 
the envisioning of new kinds of relationships.  
 My analysis concluded that the current US leadership is politically 
handcuffed to oppose the PA resolution by the powerful pro-Israel lobby, which 
pursues only right-wing interests rather than those of Palestinians, Israelis, or 
Americans.  Also, the American media has been extremely sympathetic to Israel’s 
positions on contentious questions.  In this context, Obama had to construct an 
opposition to the Palestinian statehood bid during his address to the UNGA.  
Recognizing how the political climate in the country has made a general 
American audience susceptible to be misled by a one-sided narrative, Obama was 
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able to deliver a speech that provided numerous examples of the hardships that 
Israelis face from Arab violence while overlooking Israel’s violations of 
international law.  Obama’s goal was to assure US voters of his “unshakable” 
commitment to support America’s “deep and enduring friendship” with Israel.  As 
a consequence, the United States may face international isolation and have its role 
as an objective mediator in the peace process denounced. 
  
  
  
 
   
